ABSTRACT
The use of aesthetics for classifying and accepting fresh food for sale and consumption is 8 built into food quality standards and regulations of the European Union. The food 9 distribution sector in Europe and the UK is oligopolistic in nature; a small number of 10 supermarket chains control a large market share. The influence of these 'multiples' 11 enables them to impose additional proprietary 'quality' criteria. Produce that doesn't 12 meet these standards may be lost from the food supply chain, never seeing a supermarket 13
shelf -it may not get past the supplier, or even leave the farm. Here, for the first time, we 14 estimate the quantity of food loss and waste of fresh fruit and vegetables arising from 15 cosmetic standards in Europe and UK, and its associated greenhouse gas (GHG) 16 emissions. We find few direct measurements of such losses, resulting in large 17 uncertainties for key commodities. In the context of these uncertainties, we estimate 18 avoidable FLW from on-farm cosmetic grade-outs of up to 4,500 kt yr -1 in the UK and 19 51,500 kt yr -1 in the European Economic Area (EEA). Our estimates suggest over a third 20 of total farm production is lost for aesthetic reasons, which equates to as much as 970 kt 21
CO2e (UK) and 22,500 kt CO2e (EEA) of embedded production-phase GHG emissions 22
annually. Examining the issue from the perspective of markets, suppliers, and consumers 23 we establish there is an over-emphasis on superficial qualities (i.e. cosmetic appearance) 24 of fresh produce, which leads to its unnecessary loss and waste. Using an illustrative case 25 study, we provide potential avenues to mitigate these losses and the associated GHG 26 emissions. 27 28
HIGHLIGHTS (3-5 bullets, max 85 characters per bullet)

29
 Application of cosmetic standards has resulted in substantial avoidable food 30 losses 31  Many actors across the agri-food chain enforce these standards upon farmers 32  The embedded emissions of lost sub-optimal food in the EEA is as much as 22.5 33 Mt CO2e yr -1 34  Quantity of avoidable on-farm losses remains uncertain due to a lack of coverage 35  We propose several avenues to mitigate on-farm food loss and its embedded 36 emissions 37 48
Introduction
49
Food loss and waste (FLW) is one of the great scourges of our time. In excess of 10% of 50 global population is chronically hungry (FAO et al., 2017, p. 5 ), yet we lose or waste about 51 a third of all food meant for human consumption at some point in the food supply chain 52 (FSC) (Gustavsson et al., 2011) . Producing food accounts for 10-12% of global 53 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, primarily nitrous oxide (N2O) from crop production 54 and methane (CH4) from meat and dairy production (Smith et al., 2014, pp. 822-824) . 55 Food waste alone may account for up to 16% of environmental impact of the agri-food 56 chain (Scherhaufer et al., 2018) . In addition to global food security and nutrition 57 challenges, producing food that does not serve its purpose of feeding the populace has 58 potentially avoidable climate-cost emissions embedded within it. 59
There are many drivers of FLW, from the technological to the social (Canali et al., 2016) . 60 Amongst them in the agricultural production phase are 'aesthetic imperfection' and 61 'overplanting' of produce (Parfitt et al., 2010; Teuber and Jensen, 2016, p. 34 ). These two 62 drivers are linked -farmers must meet their contractual obligations to deliver specified 63 tonnage of produce that meets particular standards (Beretta et al., 2013; Halloran et al., 64 2014) . A proportion of yield is expected not to meet cosmetic criteria and thus may not 65 easily be sold, and possibly not even harvested (Garrone et al., 2014) . Cosmetic 66 requirements are an important component of 'quality' standards for fresh fruit and 67 vegetables (FFV) -a greater number of prescribed elements apply to the appearance of 68 FFV than to nutritional or food-safety characteristics (Porter et al., 2018 
180
Where: Em is the quantity (in kt CO2e) of GHG emissions of crop j in country k for scenario 181 s; Loss (in kt) is food loss for crop j in region k from Eq 1, and; EF is the emission factor 182 (in kt CO2e kt -1 ) for crop j in country k for scenario s. Summary data is provided in Table  183 1. 184 185 actual FFV farm production intended for human consumption of 93,000 -141,000 kt for 199 the EEA, and 7400 -11,500 kt for the UK. The estimated range of on-farm cosmetic grade-200 out losses relative to total farm production in the EEA and UK is 4 -37% and 6 -39%, 201 respectively, with a 'central' value of 14% for the EEA and 20% for the UK. 202
In the UK, cosmetic grade-out losses are dominated by potatoes and carrots ( Figure 1a) . 203 This is a function of their importance as an agricultural crop -potatoes were 70% of the 204 UK FFV harvest by mass in 2016, whilst carrots were 10%. They also have higher 205 minimum, maximum, and central cosmetic grade-out LFs relative to other crops. 206
Together, these two crops account for 81 -88% of grade-out losses by mass. This is 207 equivalent to 380 -4000 kt of losses, with a 'central' value of 1500 kt. Onions and 208 cabbage, the third and fourth most important crop group for UK farming (just under 10% 209 combined total), deliver just 6 -13% of grade-out losses (250 -880 kt, 'central' estimate 210 of 390 kt). 211 
Embedded emissions of cosmetic losses 225
Applying three EF values (minimum, maximum, and 'central' estimates) for each Loss 226 scenario generates nine 'scenarios' of embedded production-phase GHG emissions. The 227 absolute and proportional emissions of three scenarios for FFV in the UK and EEA are 228 shown in Figure 2 . They are the output of Eq 3 using the Min-Min, Central-Central, and 229
Max-Max combination of Loss from Eq 1and EF values from Table 1. Relative importance  230 of crops and their production-phase emissions is evident when comparing the UK with 231 the EEA at large. Total embedded production-phase GHG emissions of food loss due to 232 cosmetic criteria in the UK range from about 60 kt CO2e in a 'minimum' scenario to 970 233 kt CO2e in a 'maximum' scenario, with a 'central' estimate of 380 kt CO2e. At the EEA level, 234 total production-phase embedded GHG emissions range from about 340 kt CO2e to almost 235 22,500 kt CO2e, with an 'central' estimate of about 3600 kt CO2e (details of all scenarios 236 are in Table SI 4) . To put these latter figures in context, they are up to roughly 5% of the 237 426,000 kt CO2e of GHG emissions attributed to the European agriculture sector in 2015 238 (Eurostat, 2017 Central, and Maximum estimates of both the LF and EF variables from 
Limitations 264
There is considerable uncertainty in these results, demonstrated by the range of our 265 estimates for absolute FFV losses at farm-level and their respective embedded emissions. 266 We have assumed that studies on these loss factors conducted on a particular crop in one 267 country within the EEA are relevant to the same crop in another country. Table  292 SI 2 
Waste currently endorsed (and 'gold-plated') by retailers
327
The evidence that sub-optimal ('imperfect'/'ugly') produce won't sell is inconclusive. De 328
Hooge et al. (2017) provides support for the claim. Their choice modelling survey 329 reported a clear preference to 'optimal' foods whether in the home or supermarket. Much 330 variability remains unexplained, but that 'beauty is good' seemed to apply to foodstuffs. 331
At least in an artificial, online environment a price discount was required to equalise 332 optimal and sub-optimal choice preference. In contrast, Aschemann-Witzel et al. (2017)  333 states that 'quality' is linked primarily to characteristics such as taste, nutritional quality, 334 and food safety. As we stated in Section 3.1, EU CMO marketing standards only specifically 335 consider the latter. Whilst urban consumers in developing and developed countries (i.e. 336
China and Denmark) may share a preference for 'perfect' produce 337 Loebnitz and Grunert, 2015), only 'extremely abnormal' cosmetic appearance affects 338 willingness to purchase in the former . Within developed countries, 339 a pro-environmental self-identity may also positively influence willingness to purchase 340 'wonky' veg . The range of these findings suggests beliefs of what 341 consumers will accept is too narrow, resulting in unnecessary food loss at the production 342 phase by prohibiting 'ugly' produce from entering food supply chain. 343
The application of retailer's private standards at the farm level influences production and 344 distribution practices. Selective harvesting is an integral component of fresh fruit and 345 vegetable production, with pickers trained to take only the produce that will meet 346 retailer's standards for sale (Gunders, 2012 Lyndhurst and WRAP, 2012). Better 'food knowledge' on behalf of the consumer -381 knowledge that is built up over time through exposure to food and its uses (which is being 382 lost in developed countries as we are ever more removed from the food chain) -could 383 result in greater acceptability of a greater range of cosmetic appearance. 384
Waste perpetuated by the structural power of large supermarkets
385
The food supply chain in many EU countries has undergone such consolidation that it can 386 be considered an oligopoly. For example, at the end of 2017, the five largest chain food 387 retailers ('multiples') had over 75% of the market share in each of the UK, France, and 388
Ireland (KANTAR WorldPanel, 2018 ). This concentration is a marked change from the 389 early post-WWII years, where multiples in the UK had a market share of 30% (Harvey, 390 2007, p. 55). Whilst the number of institutional buyers has fallen through this 391 consolidation, the supply-side of the relationship has not undergone a similar 392 transformation. The relative imbalance in scarcity -there is far more competition for 393 sellers -leads to greater power being held by the retailers as buyers (Cox and Chicksand, 394 2007, p. 83). 395
In addition to horizontal market consolidation of food retailing, some multiples have also 396 consolidated vertically, taking a controlling interest in upstream production (Simons and 397 Skydmore, 2017). Supermarkets exert their buyer power by imposing 'voluntary private 398 standards' of cosmetic specifications for fresh produce (Henson & Humphrey, 2010) . The 399 power exerted by the structure of the market -many suppliers for few retailers -acts as 400 extra-governmental regulatory reach by the supermarket multiples. Private rules may be 401 used to enhance or maintain a retailer's reputation as well as managing suppliers 402 (Fulponi, 2006) . They are codified within business relationships of the more powerful 403 party and often form part of contractual terms and conditions (Rindt and Mouzas, 2015) . 404
This power structure limits producers' ability to influence the imposition of 'quality 405 standards' (Gille, 2012) . Such standards lead to avoidable food loss at the farm-level 406 (Devin and Richards, 2016) . 407
The oligopolistic nature of many developed countries' agri-food chains effectively make 408 supplier compliance of 'private' standards mandatory (Davey and Richards, 2013 
Waste perpetuated by the consumer's learned experience
423
What produce should 'typically' look like guides purchase intentions -consumers are 424 more likely to purchase something that is familiar and recognisable (Gigerenzer and  425 Gaissmaier, 2011). Consumers use simple learned heuristics of visual appearance to 426 make food selection rather than the time-consuming process of comparing large amounts 427 of data (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2013). Consumers' lack of experience of abnormally 428 shaped food leads them to view such produce as more risky and less natural than produce 429 that conforms to supermarket standards (Loebnitz and Grunert, 2018) . Although 430 moderate differentiation/incongruity of produce may increase the attention paid to that 431 product by a consumer (e.g. a new variety of familiar produce), there is a counteracting 432 social risk of being linked with food whose appearance is atypical (Campbell and 433 Goodstein, 2001 ). Visual perception and setting influences consumers' expectation of 434 taste experience; they are less willing to purchase cosmetically 'sub-optimal' fruit than 435 consume it in the home (Symmank et al., 2018) . Consumers appear to apply a 'beauty 436 mystique' -a sociological concept to judgement where goodness is beauty and beauty is 437 goodness (Synnott, 1989) -to fresh produce. Being exposed to broader parameters of 438 'normal' during the learning phase could lead to an acceptance of 'sub-optimal' food. 439
Heuristics are well-entrenched, though may interact with each other. Knowledge of 440 origins of food (e.g. organic or not) and acceptance of abnormally-shaped food may be 441 inversely related (Loebnitz and Grunert, 2018) . The 'blender effect' of Szocs and Lefebvre 442 (2016) -greater 'processing' is required in the home to achieve acceptable palatability -443 may reduce likelihood of purchase. Labelling of visually sub-optimal produce that 444 reinforces its taste may have more influence on the purchase decision of 'ugly' food than 445 price discounts relative to optimal produce (Helmert et al., 2017 4. Learning opportunities case study 457 In this section, we use a case study as a small-scale illustration of what may be possible, 458 in a UK context, to address food loss and waste of 'ugly' produce from the endemic drivers 459 discussed in Section 3 previously. Specifically, we are concerned with avoidable food loss 460 at the farm-level as a function of aesthetics, a key aspect of quality within the food 461 industry and regulatory bodies. Care was taken in choosing a case atypical to the status 462 quo UK agri-food supply chain. Conclusions drawn may not be generalisable to other 463 fresh produce or farming operations, particularly for farms and distribution that are 464 much larger in scale and with more complex supply chains. As a single case study, it 465 should be viewed as explorative rather than definitive; a potential precursor to inform 466 larger scale investigations. However, whilst the case's operations may not be fully 467 applicable to industrial food producers, removing the real or perceived need to abide by 468 cosmetic standards unrelated to food safety could see significant cuts to food losses. This 469 section is intended to spark discussion and review of policy, custom, and behaviour to 470 improve efficiency across the food system. 471
Illustrative atypical case study: Description of case and data collection methods
472
A medium-sized farm (c. 500 acres) in the Central Belt of Scotland was selected as the 473 case study, with strawberry production as the unit of interest. The farm has been run 474 under a perpetual lease by the same family for three generations, with the current 475 generation in place for over 15 years. The farm uses standard production techniques for 476 Scotland, such as raised coir-beds within covered poly-tunnels. This protects the crop, 477 increases the length of the growing season, and eases the effort to harvest. 478
The case-study farm's changes to its business model allows an examination of each of the 479 four drivers cosmetics-related loss identified in the previous section. Losses from other 480 food supply stages inherent in more complex supply chains -specifically storage, 481 handling, process, and transport to distribution centres -are excluded here for 482 comparability. The farm had previously operated within a typical environment of 483 supplying to supermarket multiples. Dissatisfaction on multiple levels led the owner to 484 completely change to an atypical model. For the past 10 years, the food supply chain of 485 this case study is the shortest possible -direct from farmer to final consumer. There are 486 no other agents in the chain (i.e. no packers, distributors, retail supermarket multiples, 487 or other 'middlemen'). The farm thus has complete control over what it sells to 488 consumers, and when, including the level of grade-outs due solely to aesthetic reasons. 489 A mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were employed. These 490 included extensive interviews conducted over several months with the farm's owner and 491 general manager, and direct measurements of produce. As part of the case-study, we 492 sought to generate a rough estimate of avoidable aesthetics-related losses in UK-wide 493 strawberry production and their embedded production-phase GHG emissions (Eq 4). We 494 use the term 'avoidable loss' as there are no health-based reasons for the fruit to not enter 495 the supply chain; it remains safely edible. Supermarket multiples in the UK are now 496 selling some proportion of non-Class I (i.e. 'sub-optimal') fruit and vegetables as 'ugly', 497 'imperfect', or 'wonky' -a relatively recent occurrence within the UK. This is taken into 498 account in our estimates of avoidable loss in Table 2 as the variable SuboptimalSupermarket.
499
Based upon our interviews, the typical supply chain has no other economic use for out-500 graded fruit (i.e. that proportion of fruit not meeting Class I criteria); it is composted on-501 site by the producer, thereby being lost to the FSC. 502
The percentage of SuboptimalFarm fruit was estimated from strawberry produce offered 503 for sale at the case-study farm. On six days over the course of a 15-day period in the 504 latter half of June 2017 (peak season), we collected a random sample of 10% of punnets 505 for sale in the farm shop. Under the guidance of the farm owner, we applied EU quality 506 standards to categorise each berry in the sampled punnets into Class I and non-Class I, 507 which we then weighed separately. As a proxy for variable SuboptimalSupermarket, we took 508 direct measurements of shelf linear feet allocated to Class I and Class II strawberries by 509 a national supermarket chain on the same days as we collected the farm samples. 510
Harvesttotal is the five-year average of the UK strawberry harvest for 2012-16 (Defra,  511 2016). Finally, we applied the UK-specific EF for strawberries from 512 The mean proportion of 'ugly', or non-Class I, fruit from farm shop punnet samples was 550 19%, with a median of 23%, and ranged from 0 to 27%, dependent upon sample. There 551 was one outlier with a measure of zero non-Class I fruit. If this single data-point were 552 excluded -it is more than two standard deviations from the nearest -the minimum 553 proportion of 'uglies' rises to 14%, the mean matches the median at 23%, and standard 554 error contracts to 1.9% from 3.8%. The average proportion of retail space allocated to 555 non-Class I strawberries in the supermarket sample was 12%, just over half the 556 proportion measured from the case study farm (Table 2 ). This suggests actual FLW at 557 farms supplying the large retail multiples may be about 10%, similar to the value in Table  558 2 of 12%. 559
Annual UK strawberry production in the five years to 2016 averaged 102,000 t (Defra, 560 2016), of which roughly a quarter (25,300 t) was produced in Scotland (Scottish 561 Government, 2017). Scaling up the difference in non-Class I fruit sold via supermarkets 562 and that produced by our case study farm to the whole of the UK, we estimate 563 approximately 10,000 t of strawberries may be lost from the FSC due to aesthetic 564 standards. This estimated loss has the equivalent of 8000 t CO2e of embedded emissions. 565
It must be noted that these estimates are very preliminary, and are presented as only 566 potentially indicative of the avoidable loss due to cosmetics. Our case study interviewees clearly communicated the lack of power they had with 576 respect to selling their produce to retail multiples under the previous business model. 577 From their perspective, the supermarkets 'held all the cards'. At times the participants 578 discarded entire harvests by ploughing under, or even not harvested at all, where the cost 579 of harvesting was more than the price being offered by supermarkets for the produce. 580
Costs to grow the produce would still be incurred, but further losses to harvest and 'sell' 581 it would be avoided -a practice they felt was anathema to farming. 582
Farmers are expected to honour production contracts or risk being dropped. If short of 583 produce, a farmer must source it wherever possible and absorb the cost of doing so. 584
Selling direct to customer puts at least some of that power back into the hands of the 585 farmer -they have full decision-making power over what they offer for sale to the 586 customer. It is not necessary to strictly comply with the EU marketing standards. At the 587 same time, selling direct also exposes the farmer to different risks; they take full 588 responsibility for marketing their produce. Selling produce that lacks value for money 589 could quickly have a negative feedback effect, particularly if it is already selling at a 590 premium to a similar supermarket offering. 591 
